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Florida Bar’s argument was that doing 
so was harmful to the reputation of the 
legal profession, and the Supreme Court 
agreed. The case, Barton says, “evinces a 
patent sympathy for the plight of the law-
yer public image and a clear deference to 
the findings and desires of bar associations 
on these issues.”
Judges do not always rule in a way that 
advances the interest of the legal profession 
— in the above case, after all, the Supreme 
Court overturned both the district court 
and appellate court decisions against the 
Florida Bar — but the lawyer-judge hypoth-
esis has considerable explanatory power. 
It leads Barton to argue for the proposi-
tion that judges should not necessarily be 
lawyers. It might be better, he suggests, to 
follow the model of some civil law coun-
tries where judges are chosen and trained 
separately from lawyers.
Lastly, I wish to comment on Califor-
nia-based public policy consultant Adam 
Summers’ essay on the harmful effect 
of lawyer licensing. In the interest of full 
disclosure, I will mention that Summers 
quotes from a paper of mine on the sub-
ject, as well as work by others who have 
similarly concluded that licensing is bene-
ficial for the legal profession but does little 
or nothing to protect consumers against 
incompetence.
Earlier in our history, America enjoyed 
a free market in legal services — no educa-
tional credentials or licenses were required 
for practitioners, and consumers could 
deal with anyone they wanted to. The ABA, 
Summers shows, moved mountains to 
obliterate that free market and cartelize 
the legal profession. It employed its consid-
erable political clout to prevail upon state 
legislatures to mandate attorney licensure, 
which nearly all states conditioned upon 
graduation from an ABA-accredited law 
school. Little of what a lawyer needs to 
know in his work is actually learned in 
law school, and what he does use could be 
learned outside of law school. It is just a 
costly barrier to entry.
For anyone with the temerity to try 
earning money on the cartel’s “turf” with-
out becoming a member, the organized 
bar has laid down a minefield known as 
“unauthorized practice of law.” Summers 
recounts the ugly details of some of the 
cases in which individuals who have been 
rendering competent and affordable legal 
assistance without a license have been 
dragged into court by state or local bar 
officials, forced to desist, and pay penal-
ties. I am aware of no case in which a judge 
has ruled in favor of a defendant in an 
unauthorized practice case, even though 
it is usually clear in such cases that the 
defendant’s work was competent and filled 
a market need. The fact that judges are so 
sympathetic to the bar’s crusade against 
competition is strong evidence in favor of 
Barton’s hypothesis.
The Pursuit of Justice is a thought-provok-
ing volume. Running the justice system 
may be a core function of government, but 
the government could and should do a far 
better job of it.
Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures 
Still Threaten the World Economy 
by Raghuram G. Rajan 
260 pages; Princeton University Press, 
2010
Jimmy Stewart Is Dead: Ending the 
World’s Ongoing Financial Plague 
with Limited Purpose Banking 
by Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
241 pages; John Wiley and Sons, 2010
In Fault Lines, University of Chicago finance professor Raghuram Rajan gives 
his take on what led to the U.S. and global 
financial crisis of the last three years and 
what should be done about it. His analysis 
and proposals are uneven. When he sticks 
to what he knows best — international 
financial markets — he is usually clear and 
often insightful. When he ventures beyond 
his expertise — in discussing such topics as 
income inequality, education, and health 
care — he fails to go back to basics and thus 
repeats many of the myths that have been 
propagated by “progressives.”
Income inequality and housing finance 
Rajan’s basic message is difficult to put 
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succinctly. There 
are so many strands 
in his argument, so 
many hedges, and 
so much vagueness 
that this reader 
came away, even 
after a careful read-
ing of every word 
and every footnote, 
without a clear 
understanding of 
his thesis. 
But let me try 
anyway. His argu-
ment is that because 
income inequality 
in the United States 
has increased in the 
last few decades, 
politicians, aware of this but unwilling 
or unable politically to engage in mas-
sive distribution from rich to poor, have 
instead looked for a quick fix. Their quick 
fix is to subsidize home ownership for 
people who have not qualified for tradi-
tional mortgages. That was a major factor 
leading to the mess we are in. Another fac-
tor behind the mess is the incentives that 
cause financial firms to bet against the 
small probability of a large loss. Rajan’s 
solution is to pare down the amount of 
government subsidization of home own-
ership and substitute more government 
spending on schools and unemployment 
insurance for those who will often be tem-
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porary losers in a dynamic economy. 
Much of Rajan’s analysis is spot-on. In 
a 12-page section titled “A Short History 
of Housing Credit,” for instance, he walks 
us through the dreary alphabet of govern-
ment agencies that, starting during the 
Franklin Roosevelt era, subsidized house 
mortgages. Before this intervention, he 
notes, mortgages were typically for five 
years, at variable rates, and for no more 
than half the value of a house. That gave 
house buyers a strong incentive to be care-
ful before purchasing. But beginning with 
the Home Owner’s Loan Corporation and 
the Federal Housing Administration in the 
1930s, and then on to the Federal National 
Mortgage Association in all its guises (first 
as a government agency and later as a gov-
ernment-sponsored enterprise), the federal 
government shifted the risk from the bor-
rower and lender to the hapless taxpayer. 
The Clinton administration added to the 
mess in the 1990s by beefing up enforce-
ment of the Community Reinvestment Act 
of 1977. A 1995 Clinton administration 
document stated:
For many potential homebuyers, the lack of 
cash available to accumulate the required 
down payment and closing costs is the 
major impediment to purchasing a home…. 
Financing strategies, fueled by the creativity 
and resources of the public and private sectors, 
should address both of these financial barri-
ers to homeownership [emphasis Rajan’s]. 
He comments:
Simply put, the Clinton administration was 
arguing that the financial sector should 
find creative ways of getting people who 
could not afford homes into them, and the 
government would help or push wherever 
it could.
In 2004, notes Rajan, George W. Bush 
increased the low-income mandate on 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to 56 percent 
of their assets. Rajan quotes the findings of 
Edward Pinto, a former chief credit officer 
of Fannie Mae, that, on average, Fannie, 
Freddie, and the FHA accounted for 54 
percent of the house-mortgage market 
and, in 2007, a whopping 70 percent. Rajan 
comments, “It is very difficult to reach 
any other conclusion than that this was 
a market driven largely by government, or 
government-influenced money.” Indeed.
Risk | Also, I think Rajan is correct in his 
fundamental analysis of what caused the 
2007–2008 financial crisis: the mispric-
ing of risk. In a chapter titled “Betting 
the Bank,” he gives an excellent analysis 
of the incentives of financial managers 
to bet on “tail risks” — that is, risks that 
occur very rarely. If nothing goes wrong, 
the firm and manager make high profits 
and bonuses, respectively. But in that 
small-probability case where things go 
wrong, the firm takes a huge hit. He 
points out that the prospect of a gov-
ernment bailout makes the long-tail bet 
even more attractive. Interestingly, he 
does not mention Columbia University 
finance professor Charles Calomiris’s 
point that decades-old laws make it 
illegal for hedge funds to own banks or 
for any other entity to own more than a 
small percent of a bank’s shares. If such 
concentrated ownership were allowed, 
and if financial firms could count on 
not being bailed out, then owners would 
monitor management more effectively 
and be more likely to enforce restrictions 
against excessive risk-taking.
Rajan’s arguably most important 
chapter is “Reforming Finance.” In it, 
he advocates a number of major reforms 
and criticizes other proposed reforms. 
The analysis is too wide-ranging to sum-
marize. But one of the most important 
proposals involving housing finance is 
to “back off from government interven-
tion, to the extent possible.” This would 
involve breaking up Fannie and Freddie 
into a number of smaller private entities, 
none of which would have an explicit 
government guarantee, and shrinking the 
FHA and Ginnie Mae. He also proposes 
having the Fed avoid cutting interest rates 
to near zero, as he claims it did during the 
last decade. (An aside: In “Greenspan’s 
Monetary Policy in Retrospect,” (Cato 
Briefing Papers, November 3, 2008), Jeffrey 
Hummel and I show that the data do 
not support this standard view of Alan 
Greenspan’s monetary policy. Virtually 
all of the economists and journalists who 
have repeated this claim judge the tight-
ness or looseness of monetary policy by 
interest rates rather than by the growth 
of various measures of the money supply. 
By that standard, monetary policy during 
the early part of the Great Depression, 
when the money supply fell by 30 percent, 
was loose.)
One of the book’s greatest strengths is 
Rajan’s masterful exposition of the Chi-
nese government’s currency policy. He 
explains a relatively complicated issue step-
by-crucial-step. China’s central bank, the 
People’s Bank of China, buys dollars from 
Chinese exporters to keep the Chinese 
currency, the renminbi, from appreciating. 
But with the number of renminbi increas-
ing, the result would normally be inflation 
and the PBOC does not want that either. 
So, it “sterilizes” the excess renminbis by 
selling debt. To avoid paying too high an 
interest rate on this debt and taking a large 
loss, the PBOC sets interest rates artificially 
low. It does so by limiting the interest rate 
banks are allowed to pay on their depos-
its so that the government-issued debt 
is competitive. Then, when the Chinese 
government wants to limit credit, it uses 
the blunt tool of credit controls, which 
cause banks to discriminate against private 
firms that lack strong connections. That 
makes it hard for private Chinese firms to 
plan long-term. 
Criticism of Rajan | So, why am I not in 
love with this book? Start with Rajan’s 
discussion of income inequality, a crucial 
part of his case for different government 
intervention. Although he is correct that 
U.S. income inequality is high, Rajan 
also argues that U.S. income mobility is 
low and that the economic well-being of 
lower-income people is not improving. 
He writes, for instance: “[C]ross-country 
studies suggest that people in the United 
States are not much more mobile across 
income classes than in European coun-
tries.” But this nonetheless means that 
lower-income Americans are more mobile, 
if only a little, than their European coun-
terparts. More important, the income 
distribution in European countries is 
typically much more compressed than in 
the United States. Therefore, the ranges 
of income for each quintile in Europe 
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are smaller, which means that if a per-
son were to experience the same absolute 
increase in income in Europe and in the 
United States, that person would have 
a much higher probability in Europe of 
moving to the next compressed quintile. 
But income mobility in the United States 
is slightly higher even though a move up 
to the next quintile takes a larger increase 
in absolute income. This is eloquent tes-
timony to the still-large degree of income 
mobility in the United States. 
Only two paragraphs after acknowl-
edging that income mobility in the United 
States is higher than in Europe, Rajan 
treats as fact the idea that “Americans no 
longer have the chance to be upwardly 
mobile.” To be sure, he puts an “if” in 
front of this claim, but the paragraphs 
that follow suggest that Rajan accepts 
the idea that upward mobility is almost 
dead. The words “economic freedom,” he 
asserts, “offer a nightmare of great and 
continuing insecurity, and growing envy 
as the have-nots increasingly become the 
have-nevers.” 
Moreover, he makes an assertion at 
odds with much of the reality of economic 
progress. He writes, “[T]he immobile are 
hurt when others move up.” How? “When 
others in town become richer,” he writes, 
“the cost of everything goes up, and the 
real income — the income in terms of its 
purchasing power — of the economically 
immobile falls.” Certainly, one can find 
examples like that. If, for example, the 
government in a town restricts building, 
the resulting fixed supply, combined with 
increasing demand from richer people, will 
drive up the cost of housing for everyone. 
But economic progress is often the story of 
new products entering the market as luxu-
ries and later falling in price so that a gen-
eration — or even a few years — later, even 
the lowest-income people can purchase 
them. Think about VCRs, for example. 
The first ones were priced above $2,000 in 
mid-1970s dollars. Twenty-five years later, 
they often sold for under $100. Now they 
are obsolete. Or think about the falling 
prices — along with the increasing qual-
ity — of cell phones, microwaves, electric 
washers and dryers, electric dishwashers, 
and airline travel. 
To buttress his income inequality con-
cerns, Rajan throws in the emotion of envy. 
Even if the apparently immobile are buy-
ing more and better items, they compare 
themselves negatively with those who have 
even more and better items. “[M]y Chevro-
let becomes much less pleasurable when 
my neighbor upgrades from a Honda to a 
Maserati,” he writes. I think that is Rajan’s 
problem. If the apparently immobile are 
getting nicer and nicer cars — yes, even 
Chevrolets are getting better — then it is 
up to them to control their own green-
eyed monster. It is hardly an indictment of 
the system if wealthier people can afford 
Maseratis. 
Finally, he admits that one reason for 
high income inequality in the United 
States is the large number of immigrants 
who “swell the ranks of those who appear 
down and out in America.” So, earning 
low incomes in the United States is prog-
ress for those immigrants compared to 
their previous situations in their home 
countries. Although Rajan recognizes this 
fact, his discussion that follows completely 
ignores it. 
Also, although Rajan states as a prin-
ciple for policy that we should “make deci-
sion makers internalize the full conse-
quences of their decisions,” some of his 
own proposals violate this principle. One 
major violator is his idea for tax credits 
for workers who, after having worked a 
number of years, decide to take time off “to 
study or retool.” This is a subsidy to people 
where there is no large externality. Rajan 
makes this proposal because he worries 
that people do not have a savings buffer 
to handle the exigencies of the job market. 
But he never even mentions the possibility 
of a private voluntary solution: save more. 
Also, rather than eliminating the huge 
subsidy to mediocrity that current govern-
ment schools represent, Rajan writes like 
a central planner who wants, by fiat, to 
change this wage and tweak that program 
within the government school system. 
Government demands | Something that 
undercuts Rajan’s message and proposals 
is his on-again, off-again treatment of the 
incentives and motives of government 
officials. He writes, for instance:
When a U.S. Treasury employee goes directly 
from running the biggest bailout fund in 
history to work for a company that runs 
the biggest bond fund in the world, and 
when another Treasury employee goes from 
organizing financial-sector rescues directly 
to running one of the banks that is most in 
need of rescue, the public’s trust is strained. 
No matter how honorable the intentions of 
the individuals in question (and I have no 
doubt that they are honorable) or how care-
ful the new employer in avoiding conflicts of 
interest, the deals, to put it mildly, stink.
Really? He has no doubt that they are hon-
orable? Based on what evidence or rea-
soning? He does not say.
Rajan states that the adverse-selection 
problem in health insurance is that health 
insurance plans attract too many of the 
high-cost sick people and too few of the 
low-cost healthy people whose premiums 
are necessary to subsidize the expenses of 
the sick. But this statement of the adverse-
selection problem makes it sound as if it 
would be desirable to charge high rates to 
the low-risk people. In fact, the adverse- 
selection problem, if it even exists, exists 
because of the high cost to the insurance 
company of distinguishing between low 
and high risks. The solution to adverse 
selection is to distinguish between high 
and low risks and price accordingly so that 
low-risk people do not subsidize high-risk 
people. That is why it is a bad idea to ban 
insurance companies from pricing based 
on pre-existing conditions. 
Also, Rajan sometimes uses fuzzy lan-
guage where precise language is needed. 
For example, in correctly criticizing the 
proliferation of government requirements 
for people to engage in various occupa-
tions, he characterizes these requirements 
as “workplace demands.” But they are often 
simply government demands. Many peo-
ple would like to hire a flower arranger, for 
example, whether or not the government 
has certified her, but the government will 
not allow it in Louisiana. Indeed, lawyers 
at the Institute for Justice, a public-interest 
law firm, make a living suing against just 
such outrageous requirements. 
Finally, Rajan sometimes leaves out 
important details that would have been 
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easy to fill in. He writes, for example, that 
“[t]oo many mortgages came from the 
same suspect, aggressive broker from the 
same subdivision in California.” But he 
does not tell us who the broker was. Inquir-
ing minds want to know.
Kotlikoff | Laurence Kotlikoff ’s book 
Jimmy Stewart Is Dead gives an excellent, 
dramatic play-by-play on many of the 
policies that led to the financial crisis of 
2007–2008 — or should I say, 2007–201? 
— and on many of the participants. You 
will not read this book and come away 
feeling secure about our financial future. 
And the reason is that various govern-
ment policies — deposit insurance for 
bank deposits, bailing out banks and 
other financial firms, bailing out Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac — have created a sit-
uation in which we are all in this together 
whether we like it or not. (Those are my 
words, not his.) In other words, even if 
you want to avoid having your financial 
future tied in with that of Fannie Mae, 
AIG, Citibank, or the U.S. government, 
even if you prudently plan your finan-
cial life and diversify your risk, the U.S. 
government can bite you. One way is to 
tax much of your future income to pay 
for bailouts. 
Boston University’s Kotlikoff, a well-
published economist who has written 
articles for many of the top scholarly jour-
nals, writes with a humorous anger that 
is, frankly, refreshing. Here is Kotlikoff on 
Stan O’Neal, former chief executive officer 
of Merrill Lynch, who had Merrill buy $41 
billion in subprime mortgages:
Merrill, whose symbol is a horned bull and 
whose motto is “Merrill Lynch is bullish 
on America,” survived lots of bear markets, 
including the Great Depression, but it 
didn’t survive Stan.
In telling why AIG hired Joseph Cassano, 
former chief financial officer of AIG’s 
Financial Products unit, who “more or 
less single-handedly destroyed the entire 
company” by selling credit defaults swaps, 
Kotlikoff writes:
[H]e had majored in political science, which 
everyone knows provides superb training 
in actuarial science, stochastic calculus, 
time-series econometrics, risk modeling, 
and the many other, highly specialized 
mathematical and quantitative skills needed 
for a career in insurance and banking.
 Refreshingly also, Kotlikoff does not 
hesitate to criticize even his own past co-
authors. One such co-author is Lawrence 
Summers, of whom Kotlikoff writes:
Summers received $5 million for working 
just one day a week for D.E. Shaw, one of 
Wall Street’s largest hedge funds. Again, 
connections, rather than financial acumen, 
seem to have been at play in setting pay…. 
Funny enough, the Geithner-Summers plan 
for ridding banks of their toxic assets, the 
Public-Private Investment Fund … includes a 
starring role for large hedge funds.
If D.E. Shaw was paying Summers to 
advise on financial matters, they were likely 
wasting their money. When it comes to 
making financial deals, Summers’ skills 
aren’t exactly impeccable. Harvard lost well 
over $1 billion of its endowments thanks 
to interest rate swaps Summers had the 
university purchase while he was running 
the show.
Kotlikoff also retells the story of Bernie 
Madoff, who ran a Ponzi scheme that lost 
billions of dollars for his investors. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission had 
received six different complaints about 
Madoff over the years, and one of them 
was a detailed letter in 1999 that actually 
accused Madoff of running a Ponzi scheme. 
Madoff himself later pointed out how easily 
the SEC could have investigated this charge: 
check his asset holdings with the third par-
ties that supposedly hold the assets and 
conduct the trades. The SEC never did.
Financial regulations | So what is Kot-
likoff’s solution? Announce the disso-
lution of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac? 
End the policy of bailouts? End deposit 
insurance? No. Kotlikoff would dramati-
cally change the financial industries by 
having government require what he 
calls Limited Purpose Banking. Under 
this form of banking, the government 
would require all banks, which he defines 
broadly as “all financial and insurance 
companies with limited liability,” to 
operate as pass-through mutual fund 
companies. Those companies, in other 
words, would simply operate as middle-
men. They would not be allowed to invest 
on their own account. To make sure they 
do not break the rules, Kotlikoff would 
replace the existing 115 financial regula-
tory agencies (that number includes state 
agencies) with one giant regulator: the 
Federal Financial Authority (FFA). 
Kotlikoff would give the FFA a huge 
role in regulating the activities of financial 
firms. He gives an example of someone 
who wants a mortgage so that he can buy 
a house. When the potential borrower 
applies for the loan, the bank sends the 
paperwork on to the FFA, which would 
use private rating agencies to assess the 
loan’s risk. Then the FFA would reveal this 
information online (hiding the borrower’s 
identity) and open it up for bids on the 
mortgage.
Do you see the problem here? The same 
government that failed to catch Bernie 
Madoff and that takes months to get 
back to people about their applications 
for Social Security Disability Income is 
suddenly competent and able to get infor-
mation about a specific person quickly 
to a bank. I think this makes Kotlikoff’s 
proposal a non-starter, and I have not even 
discussed the fact that various financial 
firms will try to find ways around his pro-
posed draconian restrictions on corporate 
risk-taking.
The sad fact is that for all his criti-
cism of government, Kotlikoff still clings 
to a strong belief in good government 
intentions and government efficacy. For 
example, he points to the Food and Drug 
Administration as an example of a govern-
ment agency that works well. He states 
that the FDA has gotten in trouble in 
recent years “by letting the drug compa-
nies play far too large a role in the drug 
approval process,” but, he claims, “our 
drug approval system works because it’s 
not too strict.” Those who read my recent 
review of two books on the FDA (“Regu-
lation Overdose,” Summer 2010) will be 
surprised to learn that the FDA works and 
is “not too strict.” Kotlikoff actually claims 
that the FDA allows drug companies to sell 
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drugs that have not been tested. That has 
not been true since 1938. Who else thinks 
that the system does not work? Probably 
some of the tens of thousands of people 
who cannot buy drugs because the huge 
testing burdens put on drug companies 
often make the drug not worth pursuing. 
Why not get rid of Fannie, Freddie, and 
the FHA? Kotlikoff explains, “Were it not 
for new mortgages issued by Uncle Sam 
through Fannie, Freddie, and FHA, we’d 
have almost no housing market, period.” 
This is a stunning case of failing to recog-
nize what 19th century economic journal-
ist Frederic Bastiat called the “unseen.” 
The fact that the U.S. government, with 
the agencies Kotlikoff names, has pushed 
out private lending by subsidizing risk 
does not mean that if those agencies closed 
down, lenders would not exist. It is just 
that they would have tighter standards 
and mortgage interest rates would be 
somewhat higher. If Kotlikoff were to look 
at Canada’s Medicare — Canada’s single-
payer plan — through the same lens, he 
would write, “Were it not for payments 
by the Canadian government to doctors 
and hospitals, there would be almost no 
market for medical care, period.” The real-
ity, of course, is that if health insurance 
in Canada were not socialized, Canadi-
ans would buy health care as they did in 
the 1960s, before it was heavily socialized. 
When there are willing buyers and sellers, 
and neither side is subsidized, there will 
be a market as long as buyers are willing 
to pay more than the price that suppliers 
insist on. This applies whether the good is 
health care or mortgage loans.
Conclusion | So, read Rajan and Kot-
likoff if you want to learn more about the 
laws (Rajan) and the players (Kotlikoff) 
behind the current financial mess. But 
if you want solutions, Rajan has a few in 
the financial area and none outside his 
expertise, and Kotlikoff’s pet solution is 
a non-starter. 
More Guns, Less Crime:                         
Understanding Crime and Gun          
Control Laws, 3rd ed. 
By John R. Lott Jr. 
472 pages; University of Chicago Press, 
2010
John Lott’s book More Guns Less Crime, first released in 1998, has completely 
changed the debate about the effect on 
crime of individuals carrying concealed 
weapons. Instead of the old assumption 
that concealed guns mean more violent 
crime, firearms policymaking now asks 
how much of the decrease in violent crime 
is due to concealed carriage.
Although Lott’s conclusions are very 
controversial, it is not controversial to say 
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that he created and 
analyzed a massive 
data set of crime 
and socioeconomic 
statistics covering 
all counties in the 
United States for 
several decades. He 
used the data set to 
examine the effect 
of the passage of right-to-carry (RTC) 
concealed weapons laws on categories of 
violent crime such as rape, murder, and 
robbery. Lott has made his data set read-
ily available to all interested researchers, 
which is not the usual behavior of some-
one trying to hide shoddy analysis.
Unfortunately, making one’s data avail-
able to others is not a common trait of 
economists. A few attempts by researchers 
to gauge the degree to which econometric 
analyses in economic articles can be repli-
cated (meaning merely that the results are 
double-checked using the same data and 
identical statistical technique) indicated 
that many published articles in good jour-
nals could not be successfully replicated. 
(See the writings of B. D. McCullough.) 
Yet replicability is a low hurdle. If a study’s 
results can be replicated, it merely means 
that the authors are not fabricating or 
misreporting their results — it does not 
mean that their results are reliable. Nev-
ertheless, embarrassed by the poor results 
from the few attempted replications, an 
increasing number of leading economic 
journals have adopted policies requiring 
authors to make their data and regression 
codes publicly available with the hope that 
economists would be more careful if cross-
checking of results by other economists 
was possible. 
Lott’s results have passed the replicabil-
ity test with flying colors. 
The more important question is 
whether the results reported by research-
ers are robust to other reasonable choices 
for analyzing the data. Lott provides a 
large array of results in an attempt to dem-
onstrate that his findings are robust, i.e., 
that he has not tortured the data to get his 
results. Because of the controversial nature 
of the topic and Lott’s willingness to share 
data, his work has undergone a great deal 
of critical scrutiny checking the robustness 
of his findings. 
This new (third) edition of More Guns, 
Less Crime includes much new material 
representing Lott’s response to his vari-
ous critics. This debate is the focus of my 
review.
Criticism of Lott | As this edition of 
the book reveals, Lott’s initial research 
was immediately attacked with a level 
of vitriol that says more about some of 
his critics than it does about the quality 
of his work. Spokesmen for several gun 
control groups, to their shame, repeated 
allegations about Lott’s research that 
were obviously false, such as the claim 
that his research was funded by the gun 
industry because Lott was an Olin Fellow 
at the University of Chicago (equivalent 
to claiming that recipients of Rockefeller 
Foundation grants are in the pocket of 
 
